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1. INTRODUCTION:  INFRASTRUCTURE CHOICES IN PORT 
 ELIZABETH 
 
One of the great disappointments of post-apartheid South Africa, for those 
interested in infrastructure investment as a developmental, redistributive, job-
creating, health-enhancing, gender-equalising deployment of state, community, 
household and private sector resources, is just how much power large 
corporations have retained over policies and projects. Emblematic was the 
remark by the Deputy Director-General of the Department of Constitutional 
Development to the Mail and Guardian newspaper (22/11/96):  "If we increase 
the price of electricity to users like Alusaf [so as to cross-subsidise low-income 
consumers], their products will become uncompetitive and that will affect our 
balance of payments."  
 This is tragic, in the light of the mandate offered by the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP) for a balanced approach to infrastructure 
provision: 
 
The RDP integrates growth, development, reconstruction and 
redistribution into a unified programme. The key to this link is an 
infrastructural programme that will provide access to modern and 
effective services like electricity, water, telecommunications, 
transport, health, education and training for all our people. This 
programme will both meet basic needs and open up previously 
suppressed economic and human potential in urban and rural areas. 
In turn this will lead to an increased output in all sectors of the 
economy, and by modernising our infrastructure and human resource 
development, we will also enhance export capacity. Success in linking 
reconstruction and development is essential if we are to achieve peace 
and security for all (African National Congress, 1994, section 1.3.6). 
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The linkages are obvious, insofar as "major infrastructural programmes should 
stimulate the economy through increased demand for materials such as bricks 
and steel, appliances such as television sets and washing machines, and many 
other products" (1.4.3). In addition, "The key area where special measures to 
create jobs can link to building the economy and meeting basic needs is in 
redressing apartheid-created infrastructural disparities" (2.3.5)... "In particular, 
industrial expansion should follow from the extension of infrastructure to 
urban, peri-urban and rural constituencies" (4.2.2). Moreover, according to the 
RDP, prospects for economic linkages, job creation and industrial expansion 
offered by infrastructure should be matched by sensitivity to household 
consumption:  "The approach to housing, infrastructure and services must 
involve and empower communities; be affordable, developmental and 
sustainable; take account of funding and resource constraints, and support 
gender equality" (2.5.6). 
 At the same time as the RDP mandated "the expansion of the social and 
economic infrastructure to stimulate industry and agriculture" (4.2.8), it 
identified at least two central problems that relate to our concern over the 
provision of subsidised infrastructure for large corporations, namely equity and 
the maximisation of economic spinoffs: 
 
The domination of business activities by white business and the 
exclusion of black people from the mainstream of economic activity 
are causes for great concern for the reconstruction and development 
process (ANC, 1994, section 4.4.6.3). 
 
 The democratic government must develop policies to ensure that 
foreign investment creates as much employment, technological 
capacity and real knowledge transfer as possible, allowing greater 
participation by workers in decision-making (ANC, 1994, section 
4.4.6.4). 
 
Hence the provision of infrastructure and municipal services -- especially 
electricity and water -- are excellent vantagepoints to understand the 
distributional and economic choices that are open to the South African 
 




Background Research Series              Municipal Services Project 
   
3 
government, and how policy and project options have progressively narrowed 
since the RDP was drafted in early 1994. The case study before us -- the Coega 
Port and Industrial Development Zone 25 kilometers north of Port Elizabeth, 
in comparison to that city's unmet basic infrastructural needs -- allows a variety 
of social, economic and ecological factors associated with resource utilisation to 
be considered. The contrast between the Spatial Development Initiative (SDI) 
approach and a development strategy based on meeting basic needs could not 
be greater, in what is an exemplary case of resource allocation choices. 
 We begin by documenting socio-economic backlogs in Port Elizabeth and 
to some extent in the "metropolitan area" encompassing the cities of Port 
Elizabeth, Uitenhage and Despatch (Section 1.1); next we evaluate the use of 
public infrastructure subsidies at Coega (Section 2); we then make preliminary 
calculations about redirecting the use of water and electricity resources to meet 
basic needs (Section 3); and finally we conclude with an appeal for a rethink on 
economic, ecological and social justice grounds. 
 
1.1   Socio-economic conditions in Port Elizabeth  
Port Elizabeth had a population of 645 573 at the time of the 1991 Census (an 
exercise bedeviled by serious counting errors, but nevertheless necessary as a 
baseline estimate since the 1996 Census results are not yet, in mid-1998, 
available). The black townships encompassing iBhayi -- New Brighton, 
Kwazakele, Zwide, Soweto-on-Sea and others -- comprised 257 000 residents, 
while the township of Motherwell had 73 000 residents. In addition to these 
Port Elizabeth residents, another 300 000 people lived in nearby Uitenhage and 
Despatch at the time, and more recent estimates put the population of what is 
termed "the metropolitan area" at 1,2 million (Institute for Development 
Planning and Research, 1997, 8). 
 Racial divisions remain pronounced in Port Elizabeth. An estimated 57% 
of the city's residents are classified as "African," 22% are "coloured," 20% are 
"white," and 1% are "Indian." The average household size in the metropolitan 
area was 4,35 in 1993 (Institute for Development Planning and Research, 1997, 
9). With respect to income, dramatic inequality exists between race groups. Of 
African households, 79% earned less than R5 000 in 1991, while 59% of white 
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households earned at least R30 000 that year. With such a large low-income 
population, nearly a quarter of household income is spent on food, compared 
to less than 18% in Johannesburg. A combination of key socio-economic 
conditions -- income, health (life expectancy) and literacy -- make up the 
Human Development Index (HDI). At 0,67 -- on a scale where 1 is the highest, 
0 the lowest -- Port Elizabeth's HDI (based on the 1991 census) is roughly 
equivalent to that of South Africa as a whole, but the HDI for the city's African 
residents is just 0,32, compared to 0,94 for white residents (Institute for 
Development Planning and Research, 1997, 11-13). (Life expectancy indicators 
are national, it should be noted.) 
 Unemployment remains a central indicator of uneven development in Port 
Elizabeth. The metropolitan area had 344 810 economically active residents, 
according to the 1991 census, of which only 169 181 were employed, 62 994 
were in the "active informal sector," and another 57 597 were engaged in 
subsistence agriculture. The formally unemployed, according to a Vista 
University study in 1993, included 175 685 residents of the metropolitan area, 
with the unemployment rate of Africans estimated at 60,8%. Only 49 701 
unemployed residents received benefits under the Unemployment Insurance 
Act in 1997, and just 35 310 people were registered with the Department of 
Labour as formally unemployed in 1996. Of unemployed Africans, 78% had 
not had formal work for more than a year (Institute for Development Planning 
and Research, 1997, 15-17). 
 Port Elizabeth's jobs are relatively poorly paid. According to labour market 
surveys that reflect regulated sectors (i.e., not domestic work or farmworkers), 
the average minimum hourly wage in the metropolitan area was R12,84 in 1997, 
but this must be broken into skill levels to understand the high degree of 
inequality even at minimum wage levels. On average, unskilled workers received 
a minimum hourly wage of R6,27, semi-skilled workers received R8,35, and 
skilled workers received R14,35. Unskilled workers in the metallurgical motor 
sector received a minimum hourly wage of just R3,52 in 1997, or R600 per 
month. Skills shortages have been identified in technical, artisanal and 
information technology areas (Institute for Development Planning and 
Research, 1997, 17-18). 
 Education, health care and other social services leave a great deal to be 
desired. But it is worth focusing on housing, infrastructure and municipal 
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services delivery so as to identify those backlogs that can also serve as 
economic development opportunities (as discussed in Section 3). The housing 
backlog in Port Elizabeth is estimated at 68 000 units although estimates of 94 
000 units include serviced sites on which informal shacks exist (more tens of 
thousands of Port Elizabeth residents reside in somewhat more formal shacks). 
Another 66 000 units will be added to the housing demand as new households 
form over the next fifteen years. From March 1994 through April 1997, 
however, the Eastern Cape Province delivered just 6 210 subsidies (maximum 
of R15 000) through the Provincial Housing Board, and these subsidies were 
not sufficiently large to build a house. Most of Port Elizabeth's residential 
building activity (worth R106 million in 1996) was in upper and middle income 
developments. As the Institute for Development Planning and Research (1997, 
30-31) concluded, "no [low-cost] houses can be built in Port Elizabeth or 
anywhere else in the region despite any heroic effort by local government."  
 However, local government in Port Elizabeth has been taking a variety of 
steps towards delivery of basic services. These have not been sufficient, as 
documented in Section 3, to meet the water and energy needs of low-income 
households. Cut-offs of both electricity and water services have become 
commonplace due to non-payment, but Port Elizabeth has at least set up a 
system for grants to cover the cost of basic service provision to some of its low-
income households. However, this system can be improved upon, as argued 
below. 
 Notwithstanding the disastrous socio-economic conditions and the lack of 
delivery in some key areas of development, the city's economic news has not 
been all bad. The late 1980s witnessed decline and rapid job loss, yet during 
South Africa's long 1989-93 depression, Port Elizabeth managed to increase its 
Gross Geographic Product (although Uitenhage continued to lose 2-3% output 
a year). The area's economic structure shifted to rely more on government 
activity -- in 1970 the fifth most important sector following manufacturing but 
by 1990 the second most important -- while wholesale and retail trade, catering 
and accommodation slipped from second to fifth most important over the 
1970s and 1980s. Services in general (including government) comprise 26% of 
economic activity today (up from less than 12% in 1970), while manufacturing 
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slipped rapidly in importance from 1970-75 (44% to 37% of economic activity) 
and again from 1990-93 (34% to 26%) (Institute for Development Planning 
and Research, 1997, 53-63). 
 Some, including the powerful Port Elizabeth Regional Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry, believe that the areas's future lies in its role as a 
Southern Africa regional transport hub and industrial production zone for 
exports, particularly through the proposal to establish a new deep-water port 
and Industrial Development Zone at Coega, just to the north of the city and 
close to Motherwell township. The next section begins with a consideration of 
spatial integration as the basis for Local Economic Development. It then 
documents the potential Coega holds for economic success, in part in relation 
to employment and income projections. Coega is, however, quite controversial. 
While it holds promise as an international trans-shipment point, competition 
from other Southern African ports, questions as to whether Coega's advantages 
outweigh its disadvantages, and bureaucratic hurdles all have to be overcome. 
In particular, the opportunity costs of Coega have yet to be fully factored in, 
insofar as the project will consume large quantities of water and electricity 
which may be better utilised elsewhere. 
 In contrast, Section 3 suggests a redistributive strategy that makes a distinct 
break from Coega's utilisation of public funding, air and electricity, on the 
grounds that jobs, productivity and SMMEs will result, providing that 
innovative attempts to adjust pricing and demand-side management of these 
resources are not undercut by the growing momentum for privatisation. In 
each of these areas, a constructive critique and feasible alternative is offered. If 
instead of a bias towards corporate subsidies, a bottom-up approach were to be 
attempted, the implications for local reconstruction and development appear 
vast. 
 
2.  COEGA'S INFRASTRUCTURE REQUIREMENTS 
 
Port Elizabeth is no stranger to export-led growth development strategies (for 
historical perspectives, see Adler, 1993; Cherry, 1992, 1993; Mabin, 1986; 
Robinson, 1996; and Wallis, 1986). The Coega initiative -- a major new deep-
water harbour, a zinc smelter, other associated beneficiation industries, 
infrastructure for heavy industry, and an Industrial Development Zone -- is a 
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bold attempt to reindustrialise a part of South Africa that suffered enormous 
job loss and manufacturing decay during the 1980s. The primary motive for 
building the harbour at the mouth of the Coega River is to reduce the 
substantial transport cost associated with heavy industry, particularly the 
proposed zinc smelter. The Coega Industrial Development Zone (IDZ) would 
cover 10 000 hectares, encompassing most of the area north-east of Motherwell 
and the Markman industrial area which lies to the south of the Sundays River. 
 This section begins by considering the general theory behind Spatial 
Development Initiatives as the basis for Local Economic Development (2.1). It 
then examines the potential Coega holds for economic success, particularly in 
projections for employment and income (2.2). Coega does hold out promise as 
an international trans-shipment point, to be sure, but other factors must be 
overcome:  competition from other Southern African ports, and a set of fierce 
challenges with respect to labour and environment (2.3). There are also a variety 
of specific negative externalities associated with Coega's prospective use of 
resources, particularly water and electricity (2.4). 
 
2.1  Coega as a Spatial Development Initiative 
Coega is not just a transport and industrial production node. It fits into the 
envisaged "Fish River Corridor" that would stretch along the Indian Ocean to 
East London. Such development corridors or Spatial Development Initiatives 
(SDIs), formulated in 1995 by the Departments of Transport and Trade and 
Industry, aim to reduce growth discrepancies between the regions of South 
Africa, as part of a process of economic re-balancing (Jourdan et al, 1996). 
From a theoretical point of view, the concept of a corridor is not a new one. 
There are important distinctions between the old (1975) National Physical 
Development Plan and the post-apartheid National Spatial Development 
Framework. The first presumes that the mere creation of new means of 
production in a region will generate a development process. The second insists 
on the existence of a regional economic fabric and on the willingness of public 
and private business groups to invest in the sectors developed by the corridor. 
 Amongst variants of strategies in the National Spatial Development 
Framework are urban nodes (in growing cities and secondary towns); rural 
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clusters (in small towns with growth potential); sectoral strategies (e.g., 
tourism); industrial clusters (processes within and between industrial sectors); 
economic spines to direct public investment to targeted areas; and development 
corridors to link nodes of development. Corridors were meant to "facilitate 
urban integration of apartheid settlements" within metropolitan and district 
areas; "link urban nodes along major transport routes, e.g. Port Elizabeth-East 
London-Butterworth"; or link production and ports in regional corridors, e.g. 
Mpumalanga-Maputo (Hosking and Jauch, 1997). 
 Coega represents a node that entails the heavy industrial element of a 
potential corridor. Yet in the event the Fish River Corridor is never developed 
beyond Coega, there emerges the danger that the Coega Export Processing 
Zone (EPZ) will exacerbate the lack of forward and backward linkages in the 
South African economy, including that of Port Elizabeth and its hinterlands. 
There are various measures by which such zones have performed poorly in 
relation to other forms of economic activity. Job creation in Mexican and Asian 
EPZs is extremely weak, according to international studies (although in 
Mauritius it has been impressive). Technology and skills transfers have been 
largely non-existent, with managerial and technical jobs mainly going to foreign 
nationals. Given that the import content of EPZ firms tends to be 60% or 
greater, foreign exchange earnings are often overstated as an advantage of 
EPZs. The main backward linkages tend to be packaging and simple 
engineering inputs. Diversification is difficult. And financial liabilities by 
governments to EPZ firms are often extremely high due to excessive bidding 
between competitive EPZ locations (Hosking and Jauch, 1997). 
 The danger of relying upon spatial development techniques of the sort 
proposed, is that unless there are specific public investments aimed at meeting 
basic needs of low-income residents, there will continue to be a transfer of 
resources from low-income areas to areas of high but polarised growth. In 
short, SDIs have not overcome the dichotomy between top-down versus 
bottom-up development. As much as any other, Coega has largely been 
marketed as a top-down form of local economic development, with only 
indirect benefits to the citizenry. 
 
2.2  Coega's potential 
According to a recent statement by the Port Elizabeth Regional Chamber of 
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Commerce and Industry, 
 
Port Elizabeth and Uitenhage Metropole represented one of the most 
ideal venues for investment with a well planned, uncongested 
transport system, competitive municipal costs and property prices, 
labour and political stability, relative (sic) low crime levels and strategic 
location for export orientated industries. It also had great potential to 
become a major export and transport hub in Southern Africa. 
Statistics show that Port Elizabeth has experienced a dramatic drop in 
work days lost and has a crime rate approximately 20% below the 
national average in most categories of serious crime. The city is 
equidistant from Johannesburg, Cape Town and Durban making it 
ideal for national distribution purposes. The average price of a luxury 
house in Port Elizabeth is R500 000 compared to the equivalent 
homestead in Cape Town and Johannesburg which costs R1-million 
and R900 000 in Durban. The Port Elizabeth Uitenhage metropole 
has the cheapest municipal input costs when aggregating rates and 
taxes, electricity, water and refuse removal. Rail tariffs to Gauteng are 
now equalised with Durban's thus reducing critical input costs for 
business (Bay Public Relations, 1997b). 
 
These business attributes make Port Elizabeth attractive to investors, 
but there is also a more fundamental economic logic to relocation. 
According to the Coega Implementing Authority (1998, homepage), 
 
The Eastern Cape is both nationally and internationally centrally 
located providing a suitable location for local and international 
industrial development. South African development has previously 
been focused on import substitution, making location close to the 
major consumer markets, most suitable. The IDZ is export focused 
and thus logically located on the coast. 
 
If Coega goes forward, it will cater for most of the city's industrial 
development activity. The Coega Implementing Authority (1998, 
homepage) provides a list of Coega's attractions: 
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"•  10 000 hectares of open land suitable for industrial 
development, with almost unlimited capacity for expansion;  
 
•  the proposed IDZ is close to main road and rail links, and the 
Department  of Transport has already committed to a road 
interchange and is considering rail upgrades necessary to meet 
demand;  
 
  •  neighbouring metropole has extensive established infrastructure 
with spare capacity; 
 
•  IDZ is close to the Motherwell residential area and there is 
extensive land already identified for further residential 
development; 
 
  •  adjacent metropole has substantial training facilities in Port 
Elizabeth  Technikon, University of Port Elizabeth, which could 
quickly respond to the training needs; 
 
 •  topography of the area allows for a deep water port with current 
draught estimated at 23 meters; 
 
  •  proximity of Eskom's main supply substation at nearby Grass 
Ridge enables the supply of the required electricity; 
 
  •  water supply is readily available from either the Orange River 
Supply line which passes near by or from the Fresh Water Flats 
facility which is currently pumping half of its purified water 
back out to sea; 
 
  •  remaining bulk infrastructure requirement is already in place at nearby 
Markman Industrial Township, and could be readily extended." 
 
In addition, the Authority (1998, homepage) promises the following will be 
available at Coega:  "purpose built facilities; latest conveyor technology to be 
world class competitive; skilled and unskilled labour pool, and a specifically 
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negotiated labour dispensation; tax incentives and concessions; scope for 
vertical integration and supply chain management by location of downstream 
and upstream industry in the zone; and cheap energy." 
 In the planning stages, the anchor for Coega has been a proposed R2,6 
billion zinc smelter by Billiton, a subsidiary of Gencor which is independently 
listed on the London Stock Exchange (and which until the mid 1990s was a 
subsidiary of Shell Oil). One of Billiton's most important assets is its chief 
executive, Mick Davis, who as Eskom treasurer approved arrangements that led 
to sales of electricity to Alusaf for a similar electricity-consuming smelter at an 
extremely low price. Cheap electricity is also a precondition for the Coega zinc 
smelter. In return, South Africa is promised expanded GDP and employment. 
 The most recent economic assessment of the Coega IDZ and Harbour 
Project available was Pakes and Nel's Preliminary Economic Assessment of the 
Proposed Coega Industrial Development Zone and Port (12 March, 1997). Three 
scenarios for the project are sketched in the Pakes and Nel (March, 1997) 
preliminary economic assessment, based on "conservative," "optimistic" and 
"high road" investments. The Conservative Scenario (Coega 1) is based on the 
key anchor projects (the Billiton zinc refinery, the phosphoric acid plant 
proposed initially by Kynoch, and the PPC cement plant). The Optimistic 
Scenario (Coega 2) includes the anchor projects plus a steel mill and stainless 
steel plant, and possibly a ferro-manganese smelter. The High Road Scenario 
(Coega 3) includes all of these plus potential further growth, including 
petrochemicals, batteries, steel mill ore processing, and several other firms 
which have expressed interest (such as Powertech and Algorax). (This list is 
incomplete, for the Eastern Province Herald has reported other companies as also 
having expressed interest in investing in the IDZ since Pakes and Nel's report 
was written. The most disconcerting aspect of Pakes and Nel's economic 
scenario assessment is that it is unclear how reliant all of these projects are on 
the Coega IDZ proposal. Some companies may well be able to, and intend to, 
proceed within the current industrial areas of Port Elizabeth even if the Coega 
IDZ and Harbour Project does not go ahead, and for this reason would not be 
lost to Port Elizabeth, e.g., Algorax and PPC. An aspect which raises doubts 
about plausibility of the "optimistic" and "high road" scenarios is the lack of 
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detail available about the key major projects listed, e.g., the steel and the 
petrochemical producing plants. Assuming environmental constraints would 
not exclude them from the area, are there companies which are really interested 
in starting these industries in Port Elizabeth in preference to where one would 
expect them to link in better, e.g., at Mossel Bay or Durban for a petro-
chemical industry?) 
 The income and employment figures of the three scenarios are provided in 
Table 1. 
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Investment, direct income and employment 

















(a) Conservative        
 New Port  1 275  12  12  100 
 Other 
 Infrastructure 
  779  -  -  - 
 zinc and 
phosphoric acid 
plants3 
 2 325  179 272  750 
 cement4  (850)  -  -   - 
Total - Conserv.  4 379  191 284  850 
     
(b) Optimistic      
 Conserv. Total  4 379  191 284  850 
 Steel plants  6 500  780 not estimated 1 350 
Total - Optimistic  10 879  971 not estimated 2 200 
     
(c) High Road     
 Optimist. Total 10 879  971 not estimated 2 200 
 Assumed others5   940  116 not estimated  521 
Total - High Rd. 11 819 1 087 not estimated 2 721 
 
Sources:  Based on Pakes and Nel, March, 1997, Tables 22-33; Black and Saxby, 
November, 1996; African Environmental Solutions Proposed Eastern Cape Zinc 
Refinery and Associated Phosphoric Acid Plant:  Final Environmental Impact Report:  
May 1997. 
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Notes: 
1. Total investment including both private and public sources. 
2.  25-40 years; plant decommissioning may be necessary after 40  
years. 
3. There are slight divergences in figures used by different sources. 
4. PPC are included by Pakes and Nel (March, 1997) in the 
construction phase of the project, but not in the operational phase. 
PPC have formally committed to the Coega project, but this 
represents a zero sum gain for Port Elizabeth given that PPC had 
already announced a new factory in the metropolitan area. A more 
consistent approach than that taken by Pakes and Nel (1997) would 
have been to have excluded PPC altogether from the investment, 
income and jobs analysis, which is the approach taken above. 
5. The investment, extra permanent direct income and extra 
permanent direct employment attributed to the "assumed others" 
(high road) are deduced using the same proportions as Pakes and Nel 
use with respect to the steel mill (Table 33). 
 
2.3  Coega contested 
Given that, as Table 1 documents, so few permanent jobs will be created and 
such a low domestic rate of return achieved on even the private investment, 
there has been quite intense controversy about Coega's appropriateness, both 
from a public interest perspective and from the standpoint about whether 
public or private funds should drive the large port investment. Competing 
visions of economic development strategies have long divided Port Elizabeth's 
various interest groups. The area's citrus farmers, environmentalists, some 
sections of black communities and organised labour have expressed disquiet 
about Coega, all for different reasons, ranging from competing uses of 
resources to ecological concerns. The use of vast sums of public monies to 
subsidise corporate development is difficult to justify when there are competing 
projects that more directly serve the interests of the majority. 
 Indeed how much responsibility for Coega's capital expenditure falls on the 
public, as opposed to private purse, remains unresolved. "At issue is who will 
provide the funding?," journalist Ed Richardson (1997b) remarked: 
 
Of concern to the Coega backers is a statement by the co-ordinator 
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for special projects for Trade and Industry, Paul Jourdan. Interviewed 
after the cabinet investment committee briefing [in June 1997], 
Jourdan hinted that government was looking to the private sector to 
bankroll the investment. Observers say that government, having 
funded and given its moral support to the Coega initiative, now either 
doesn't have the available funds or else expects the private sector to 
come up with the full R1,5 bn. The problem with finding private 
capital, as Jourdan points out, is that the project will produce a real 
rate of return of only 2% in phase one. 
 
High levels of corporate subsidies are expected, since, according to Richardson 
(1997a), 
 
private-sector stockholders slammed suggestions the harbour be a 
"build, operate and transfer" (BOT) option, implying the private 
sector would have to finance the port and IDZ's infrastructure. "The 
private sector has already committed over R30 million in project 
planning and hopes to invest R5 billion in industrial operations, on 
condition there is a port," said Mark Drewell, of cement company 
PPC. "To expect a port's dead infrastructure to be financed by the 
private sector is totally devoid of economic reality. This kind of 
infrastructure requires a public sector commitment. Only once the 
infrastructure is in place can we realistically talk about a public-private 
sector partnership." 
 
The public sector's R1,5 billion investment over three years would pay for itself, 
insisted Wakeford (interview, April 1998), for Portnet could leverage its 
anticipated income so as to justify the funding on economic grounds. With an 
annual profit of in excess of R150 million from just its Port Elizabeth port, 
Portnet could establish a separate commercial business unit in the city so as to 
provide the basis for financing the R300 million a year it would require to 
service debt on Coega port construction. 
 Yet whether the project would be economically viable depends partly upon 
whether the Coega port would generate sufficient business to compete given 
 




Background Research Series                                                                Municipal Services Project 
16 
international shipping trends. According to the sales director of P&O Nedlloyd, 
Richard Burmeister (speaking at the March 1998 Intermodal Africa 
conference), "Port Elizabeth is ideally situated on the southern tip of Africa and 
could become the major shipping hub of the sub-continent" if a deep-water 
port is constructed at Coega (Richardson, 1998a; Neill, 1998). Proponents of 
Coega point to the 14-17 meters depth which global shipping will require of 
hub ports (Reid, 1998, 10). 
 On the other hand, there is some question as to whether Coega is required 
when South Africa has existing deep-water ports on the Indian (Richard's Bay) 
and Atlantic (Saldanha Bay) Oceans, and when transhipment from such ports 
might serve Port Elizabeth's development needs just as easily. "The future of 
container ship development is clouded by the competing trends of economy of 
scale and Just-in-Time ocean transport," according to Robert Reid (1998, 14). 
The crucial question for Coega is thus whether the future is based on the fact 
that, as Reid (1998, 10) puts it, "container ship design is relentlessly pursuing 
economies of scale in capacity and efficiency" or, in contrast, on the fact that, 
simultaneously, "revolutionary container ship designs are pursuing shorter 
transit times and higher service frequency" entailing "smaller, faster ships [and] 
daily sailings." If the former is the case, a port at Coega may be sensible; if the 
latter is true, then it is probably more appropriate to develop other ports with 
better access to South African markets. The Maputo Port, for example, 
presently operates at roughly 30% the capacity it had just before independence 
in 1975 and notwithstanding the fact that it is in Mozambique, remains the 
closest port -- at 400 km overland distance -- to the large Gauteng market. 
 Coega proponents claim that transhipment from large cargo ships that 
carry as many as 6 000 containers to smaller, speedy ships would have to occur 
in deep-water ports perhaps as far away as Latin America, thus adding R5 000 
in cost per container (interview, Wakeford). But one expert, John Vogt (1998, 
2, 5) of Rennies Logistics, argues that today, ships 
 
are not just chosen to be bigger. We may perceive that bigger is better 
but it is a lot more scientific than that. The size is in fact the 
consequence of the volume of traffic and the value of the goods. 
These drive the balance between the time of loading the ship, sailing 
time and frequency of sailings required by the clients. Big is not 
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beautiful in this context -- goods on time and frequently and in the 
right place is the requirement of Logistics... The proponents of extra 
deep berths to cater for the largest ships are not looking at economic 
logic. 
 
It is hard to answer the question definitively at this stage, for as Reid (1998, 18) 
conceded, 
 
The ultimate goal of geographically fixed ports in shippers'/carriers' 
global supply chains has yet to be determined... Carriers' loadcentre 
strategies are still evolving; flexibility, adaptability, and reliability 
require that ports do more; and identifying the customer (carrier, 
third party, shipper) will remain a dilemma. 
 
In the intensifying competition amongst ports to attract carriers, the only 
variables that port management itself controls are infrastructure (channels and 
facilities) and pricing. Related cost factors (management-labour relations, inland 
connections, regulatory and environmental issues) can only be influenced (not 
controlled) by particular port managers. And other important factors (cargo 
routing decisions, ocean and rail transport services, vessel and inland transport 
technologies and competitor ports' strategies) are entirely beyond the ability of 
a single port to manage (Reid, 1998, 20). So too is the scale at which global 
overtrading will generate global deflationary pressures, leaving South Africa -- 
perennially in the lowest 10 percent of the leading four dozen trading nations -- 
with a far lower propensity to export and hence import than is currently 
envisaged (for example in the optimistic Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution strategy). The ongoing macroeconomic and export-led policy 
failures, will ultimately have a negative effect on South Africa's ports. 
 Assuming that economies of scale considerations do ultimately outweigh 
flexibility, Coega would still have to convincingly demonstrate its comparative 
advantage in several key respects. Reid (1998, 11-12) listed requirements for 
ports in coming years, in addition to depth:  3 300 meter long berths; 3-4 cranes 
that cater for post-Panamax ships; 16-20 hectares of backlands per berth; on-
terminal or contiguous rail links; feeder networks; dedicated terminals; flexible 
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and reliable labour; competitive rail and trucking; equipment and customer 
support; and a medium to large local market. Inland from the port itself, 
requirements include efficient port-inland interface; multiple arterial roadways; 
immediate access to main rail lines; an inland depot network; transloading 
services; intermodal rail; high service frequency and fast transit times; and 
opportunities within the local market of balancing flows of trade. Where these 
do not yet exist at Coega, they will be extremely expensive to construct, as 
noted above. 
 Is Coega the optimal site for meeting these requirements, compared to 
Richard's Bay or Saldanha? According to Vogt (1998, 3), "to achieve volume for 
a cost effective port, you can not have many hub ports in one region. Inter-
regional ships will not call at more than one port." Table 2 provides a ranking 
of Southern African ports (Wessels, 1998, 1-2): 
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Volume of activity at Southern African ports (1996) 
 
Port  Tonnes (000) 
 
1)   Richard's Bay  78 619 
2)   Durban   31 510 
3)   Saldanha Bay  20 350 
4)   Cape Town    6 797 
5)   Port Elizabeth    5 300 
6)   Dar es Salaam    3 535 
7)   Maputo     3 177 
8)   Beira     2 971 
9)   Walvis Bay    1 782 
10)  East London    1 269 
 
East London's port is remarkable mainly for serving as the region's largest silo 
for maize exports. Port Elizabeth currently handles automotive and other heavy 
industrial cargo, as well as fruit, manganese ore and processed agricultural and 
leather products. The problem with the current Port Elizabeth facilities, 
according to Coega IDZ Initiative (1998, 7) promotional material, is that it "is a 
shallow water port permanently constrained by the historical urbanisation of 
the City. Continued development of the existing port for industrial purposes 
will furthermore limit tourism opportunities in the Metropole." On the other 
hand, Port Elizabeth has begun making investments for modernisation, 
including four gantry cranes for containers that are  
 
part of a three-year programme to increase container handling 
capacity at the port. Refurbished cranes were bought from the port of 
Durban in May 1996 and again in 1997 to supplement the two 
existing cranes which were taken out of service for refitting. At the 
same time the height of the two cranes was raised to cater for post-
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Panamax vessels (Bay Public Relations, 1998c). 
 
Unfortunately, the existing Port Elizabeth port -- with its extensive sunk 
investments -- would be largely redundant if Coega is built, since oil tanks and 
the iron ore berth would likely be moved to Coega possibly along with the 
refurbished cranes (Matavire, 1997). One use of the existing port area may be 
tourism, since for aesthetic reasons there is not much scope for Port 
Elizabeth's waterfront development while the port remains active. A casino and 
access to steam-powered rail for tourists have been proposed for the land 
around the port, which are said to be worth R500 million alone if the area were 
to be redeveloped (interview, Wakeford). 
 But Coega champions have not convinced shipping experts of its own 
superiority compared with regional competitors. Aside from Burmeister's 
presentation, conference papers from Intermodal Africa 98 -- the most recent 
showcase for port and shipping issues in the region -- included barely a positive 
mention of Coega, though deep water bays at Saldanha (20,5 meters), Richard's 
Bay (19,5 meters), Nacala (60 meters) and Walvis Bay were discussed in depth, 
along with Maputo and Beira (both much shallower ports) and several West 
African ports. Depth remains an important aspect of competitiveness, although 
how important in relation to other factors is still not determined. Cape Town's 
port is relatively shallow (and is also plagued by weather and capacity 
constraints). The Port Elizabeth port depth is 12,2 meters, while East London's 
is 10,6 meters. 
 Coega's disadvantages stem partly from the fact that due to the lack of 
existing facilities, there are few carriers familiar with its potential. Nevertheless, 
Coega champions like Wakeford (1997a) argue that "Richard's Bay is a sterling 
example of a greenfields project that created 30 000 direct jobs in a period of 20 
years albeit that not even one anchor tenant was lined up prior to the 
commissioning of their deep-water facility." The Port Elizabeth Regional 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (1998, 2) explains, however, that 
Richard's Bay is now 
 
operating close to maximum capacity and would require additional 
extensions... The port and industrial park in the nearby area was 
constructed over 20 years ago and is not configured as a world-class 
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modern entity. Major South African companies are also over-exposed 
from an investment profile viewpoint as they have not really had any 
other east coast deepwater alternative as a venue for new factories. 
Should Richard's Bay for instance experience political or labour 
upheaval, not mention the likes of a natural disaster, the 
consequences are obvious for any astute businessperson... Saldanha 
Bay are also experiencing capacity problems and in fact, are going 
through a minor expansion to cope with the increased activity... We 
believe that Saldanha's niche markets are location driven. Her 
positioning on the West Coast will attract those investors servicing 
Europe and the Americas. Coega on the other hand has a stronger 
focus on servicing those industries targeting the markets of the Far 
East and South East Asia. In addition, Coega is bound to attract 
industries that require a more modernised and purpose-built 
infrastructure. 
 
Concludes Wakeford (1997b), "Both Saldanha Bay and Richard's Bay will 
struggle to compete with a world-class modern facility at Coega." However, for 
this to be convincing, Coega's other disadvantages must be overcome. 
 For example, Coega presently suffers a lack of connecting transport 
infrastructure. A central requirement for Coega's development as a hub is the 
establishment of "feeder services between Port Elizabeth and Durban, and Port 
Elizabeth and Cape Town," according to Burmeister (cited in Richardson, 
1998a; Neill, 1998). Moreover "A fast, dedicated and efficient rail link must be 
set up to Gauteng and a new and more modern railhead must be developed at 
an appropriate site." In addition, Burmeister noted, "A large, well-established 
central warehouse must be established, run by professionals with modern and 
efficient systems." 
 Another challenge remains the strong labour movement in the Eastern 
Cape, notwithstanding Coega promotional promises of a "specifically 
negotiated labour dispensation" (itself not by any means secure, given Cosatu 
resistance to IDZs). According to an Andrew Levy and Associates study issued 
in 1997, 51,5% of all recent strikes were national, and were generally well-
supported in the Eastern Cape. Only in KwaZulu-Natal (27,5% of all strikes) 
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were there more provincial- and local-level strikes than in the Eastern Cape 
(9%) (Bay Public Relations, 1997c). Strike days in Port Elizabeth recently 
peaked at 262 934 in 1994 (the year of the national automotive strike) but were 
down to 72 941 by 1996, of which 70% were days lost to unprocedural strikes 
(Institute for Development Planning and Research, 1997, 19). In August 1997, 
a 24-hour strike paralysed the province, leading the Port Elizabeth Regional 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry to comment, 
 
The time has arrived for the labour movement to "get real" and 
accept that we are now an inextricable part of the international 
economy which is highly competitive and unsentimental to domestic 
problems. The Eastern Cape has an already fragile economy as a 
result of previous marginalisation and growing international 
competition. The business community cannot sustain on-going 
disruption and rolling mass action for much longer (Bay Public 
Relations, 1997a). 
 
In addition to the potential for labour mobilisation -- given in part 
that there is intense opposition from Cosatu to export processing 
zones such as Coega, where the main value added is inexpensive 
labour -- ecological challenges are also certain to dog the proposed 
project. Citrus farmers protested the potential emissions from the 
proposed zinc refinery in 1997. A study confirmed that "if you have 
unbridled and uncontrolled development at Coega, the potential for 
adverse effects on peoples' health, crops and agriculture is 
enormous," according to a Coega official. However, he continued, "It 
also confirms that if you keep emissions from industry to a minimum 
level, there should be no adverse effects on agricultural crops and 
particularly the citrus industry." Although the study had been made 
available to the citrus farmers, the official continued, "despite that 
they remain unconvinced and have continued bombarding various 
authorities, ministries and private groupings with their objections" 
(Cull, 1997). 
Notwithstanding cabinet-level assurances given by Minister Erwin 
that "The environmental issue has been addressed and will continue 
to be addressed" (Bay Public Relations, 1998b), concerns persistently 
arise -- and have not been conclusively answered by Coega 
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champions -- regarding the extent to which local ecology will be 
protected. The need for independent analysis was recently highlighted 
by Richard Fuggle, one of South Africa's leading authorities on 
environmental assessment. In his commentary on the Strategic 
Environmental Assessment for The Proposed Industrial Development Zone and 
Harbour at Coega, commissioned by the Coega IDZ Section 21 
company and published by the consultants, Fuggle concluded, 
 
 The so-called Strategic Environmental Assessment is in my view 
incorrectly titled. This study is no more than a very general 
assessment of the proposed Coega project. There is no analysis of 
possible policy or programme alternatives:  no systematic comparison 
of alternatives, and no analysis of how existing activities (e.g. salt 
extraction, citrus farming, market gardening, dairying) will be affected 
by the new initiatives. It is simply not an Strategic Environmental 
Assessment as the term is generally understood in the professional 
literature. It is not a document that can be used to guide decision 
makers at a strategic or policy level. (Review of documentation 
pertaining to Coega IDZ initiative, for Eastern Cape Citrus Forum, 
14 July, 1997). 
 
A final aspect of pre-implementation planning that gives rise for concern is that 
the character of subsequent IDZ investment remains largely unplanned, leaving 
open the possibility that Coega will follow the example of relatively poorly-
linked South African predecessors, where megaprojects have not been 
sufficiently rooted in a local economy (Fine and Rustomjee, 1996). As 
Wakeford (1998, 2) articulated the choices: 
 
Our marketing strategy should provide scope for the expansion of 
current business and linkages both forward and backward should be 
sought with new investors in a typical cluster format. The strategies 
should also focus on the establishment of new investment from our 
existing business base. In other words, creating the right support and 
environment for economic downstream stimulation. This is far more 
vital than attracting a once-off investment flow... We must begin by 
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conducting market research to determine possible niche markets and 
the sustainability of proposed industrial clusters. The value added 
potential or downstream opportunities which can ride on the back of 
foreign direct investment should also be structured into the research. 
 
That such research has not been completed at this stage is a cause for worry, 
especially because the potential for South African industrial clusters has been 
thrown into question by the Department of Trade and Industry itself. After the 
Department commissioned detailed studies on thirty industrial clusters from 
1994-96, the chief director responsible for the research testified to parliament in 
1997 that the entire cluster strategy was "in trouble." Moreover, as Business Day 
(10/3/97) reported, "Many cluster studies had taken on the aspect of a religious 
reevaluation where participants bowed down to the God of globalisation, but 
few concrete and measurable targets had been laid down." 
 On top of all of these challenges is the growing realisation that there are 
substantial negative externalities associated with the proposed Coega industrial 
activity. 
 
2.4   Negative externality costs of the Coega IDZ and Harbour Project 
The key negative externalities associated with the industrial activity at Coega 
appear in the damage that industrial activity at Coega will do to eco-tourism, 
fishing income, agriculture and public health. More research is required on the 
income and recreation value losses due to the Coega IDZ and Harbour Project 
than is available in the Environmental Impact Assessments. The estimates 
provided below are merely a starting point for further analysis. 
 
2.4.1   Eco-tourism and recreation values/income 
The proposed Greater Addo Park, the beaches, the estuaries, the islands and 
the whales would all be adversely affected by the Coega IDZ and harbour. The 
Coega EIR (CEN, 1997, 253) recognises that eco-tourism may constitute an 
opportunity cost of the Coega IDZ, however, the issue is not explored, other 
than by way of noting that the National Parks Board has a vision of extending 
the Addo Elephant National Park to the mouth of the Sundays River (a 
questionable initiative if Coega's industrial activity proceeds). 
 That vision -- the Greater Addo National Park Initiative (or Greater Algoa 
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Park as it is sometimes referred to) -- aims to incorporate the expansion plans 
of the Addo Elephant National Park with a contract parks system on privately 
owned farm and various provincial reserves in order to bring more than 400 
000 ha under one management system and authority. Ultimately the Greater 
Addo National Park will consist of 6 biomes, ranging from marine coastline to 
Karoo scrub, through Alexandria and Afromontane forest, fynbos, savanna, 
grassland and valley thicket. The restocking program has already begun with the 
intention of reintroducing all of the original fauna types, including the big five 
(interview, Anthony Hall-Martin, Director of Research and Development, 
National Parks Board). 
 The Coega IDZ interrupts the lateral bisect of the corridor between the 
Groendaal Wilderness Area and the Addo Elephant National Park. The 
opportunity cost of the Coega IDZ is the consumer surplus and tourist revenue 
foregone as a result of locating this extended national park further away from 
Port Elizabeth than it could otherwise be if the Coega IDZ project were 
abandoned in favour of a plan which allowed for a contract park to extend into 
the Coega area as well. 
 Besides the Greater Addo National Park there are also a number of other 
natural tourist and recreational attractions which can be expected to be 
negatively affected by the Coega IDZ and Harbour project, e.g., the Coega 
estuary, the St Croix Island group, the beaches in the area of the Coega mouth 
and the over 400 Southern Right Whales that annually enter Algoa Bay. Since 
1996 whale watching has grown rapidly as a tourist attraction of Algoa Bay 
(interview, Norbert Klages). There are some studies on the recreation values of 
these natural assets, but much still remains. 
 To summarise the studies, Geach (January, 1997), using the Clawson and 
Knetsch (1966) Travel Cost Method, estimated the existing Addo Elephant 
National Park's annual recreational value to be over R300 million. Addo 
Elephant National Park receives about 80 000 visitors per annum, about half of 
which are foreign tourists. The Park itself collected about R2,4 million from 
these visitors in 1992; about R3,4 million at 1996 price levels. Hotels, airlines, 
transport companies and other domestic businesses would undoubtedly have 
collected much more than this in providing services to these visitors. All these 
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sums are included in the recreational valuation. 
 Smale and Buxton (1985, 142) argued that an estimate of the recreational 
value of the linefisheries in Algoa Bay was urgently needed (so that the 
importance of the industry could be properly documented). McGrath and 
Horner (1996) provide us with some insight into the matter. Addressing a 
National Productivity Institute conference in Port Elizabeth they estimated that 
linefisheries in South Africa's coastal provinces generated about R2 167 million 
in income (about 1,3% of the GGP of these provinces) and about 131 560 
jobs. If this proportion is applicable to the Port Elizabeth area the linefishery 
industry alone is worth about R200 million per annum here. 
 No studies have been carried out on the recreational values of visitors 
other than by fishermen to the beaches and dunes in the area, e.g., bathers and 
hikers. Presumably it also would be substantial. Here we recognise that income 
generated for recreational uses is primarily sourced from higher-income 
households, whereas the non-pecuniary satisfaction of those users of the Coega 
area from lower-income households may also be substantial, even if impossible 
to enumerate. Moreover, no studies have been carried out on the use values 
attached to the St Croix Islands, nor have studies been carried out on the 
recreational value to scuba divers of the diving sites in the affected area of 
Algoa Bay. 
 In sum, based on those studies that have been carried out the total annual 
recreational value of the natural assets negatively affected by the Coega IDZ 
and Harbour Project could be in the region of R500 million. If only 10% -- a 
guesstimate -- of this is lost due to the Coega IDZ and Harbour Project, the 
ecotourism opportunity cost per annum is R50 million. 
 
2.4.2   Fishing income in Algoa Bay 
The potential opportunity cost of the Coega IDZ in terms of fishing yields is 
acknowledged in the Coega EIR where it is stated that this impact will need to 
be "considered" (CEN, 1997, 253). It is stressed that information on this score 
will need to be available before a decision on the harbour is taken (CEN, 1997, 
205). 
 The potential effects of the Coega IDZ and Harbour Project on the Algoa 
Bay fisheries are important, for the IDZ will undermine the growth of 
phytoplankton to the east of the proposed harbour as a result of disruption to 
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the water circulation patterns in the bay from harbour structures. The 
phytoplankton growth in the area between the Coega river mouth and the 
Sundays river mouth is critical in sustaining the food chain in Algoa Bay. 
 More generally, the food chain upon which the fisheries depend will be 
disrupted, for at least three reasons:  closure of important fishing grounds as a 
result of increased commercial shipping in the area (Wooldridge, Klages and 
Smale, 1997); increased pollution in Algoa Bay (Final EIR, 178, 180; 
Wooldridge et al); and dredging effects on currents in Algoa Bay, reduced 
photosynthetic activity, and disturbance of natural and anthropogenic 
contaminants in silts (Final EIR, 175, 178, 180). 
 Understandably, many members of the fishing industry in Algoa Bay are 
concerned about the impact on their incomes of the Coega IDZ (interview, 
Rada Demain, Port Elizabeth Fishing Forum). The Chokka fishery in Algoa 
Bay is the third most productive in South Africa. It generated an income of 
about R66 million in 1993 (Norbert Klages, pers comm., July, 1997) which is 
equivalent to about R85 million in 1996. It is estimated that the inshore trawl 
fishery landed a total of about 1 100 tons of fish (1 550 tons live weight) in Port 
Elizabeth during 1981, much of which was hake (Smale and Buxton, 1985, 
141). Hake currently retails in Port Elizabeth for about R14/kg, so that 1 100 
tons of it would fetch about R15 million. There also is a significant linefishery 
in the area (Wooldridge, Klages and Smale, 1997, 27). During 1980 the catches 
of the 300 members of the Port Elizabeth Deep-Sea Angling Club were 
monitored, and it was estimated that they caught about 32 tons of fish (Smale 
and Buxton, 1985, 141). Setting aside the recreational value of the club's 
activities, the actual value of this fish is about R328 000 (assuming R14/kg). 
 Actions which undermine this industry give rise to opportunity costs, but 
at this point in time there is insufficient information on which to base an 
estimate of them. If the undermining effect is only about 20% -- a guesstimate -
- we could expect the opportunity cost to be about R20 million per annum 
[20% of (R85 + R15) million]. 
 
2.4.3   Farm income and air emissions 
The Sundays River citrus and vegetable yields, and animal products in the 
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Coega and Alexandria areas, could all be adversely affected by Coega's air 
emissions. The Eastern Cape citrus industry, which earned about R523 000 000 
from citrus exports in 1996, is projected to earn about R706 000 000 in 1997 
(Outspan International, 1996). It employs about 19 000 people directly. Over 
65% of this industry is located in the Coega and Sundays River Valleys. About 
one third of the cultivated area in these valleys is under vegetables. 
 This citrus industry may be threatened by emissions into the air (and 
possibly wastes into subterranean water reserves) from the heavy industries 
located in the Coega IDZ. According to the study commissioned for the EIR 
process, "the level of fluoride emissions (from Billiton/Kynoch alone) can 
definitely be expected to injure plants in the Coega area, as well as for several 
kilometers along the narrow corridors of the predominant wind directions" 
(Botha and Olbrich, 1997). 
 Second, with respect to the effects of sulphur dioxide emissions, the 
project manager of Billiton Zinc Refinery (Norman Green) made the point that 
"critical [life-threatening] SO2 levels for agricultural crops, forest trees and 
natural and semi natural vegetation are used [in planning estimates]. These are, 
respectively, 30, 20, and 20 ug/m3" (letter to CM Logie, 14 May 1997). 
 The zinc and phosphoric acid facility SO2 levels are calculated in modeling 
exercises to reach levels of 15 ug/m3. It is unclear if this level includes the 
contribution of existing ambient levels within the proposed IDZ. The predicted 
normal ambient concentration of SO2 in the air with the zinc/phosphoric acid 
plant is 59 ug/m3 (83 ug/m3 in upset conditions), but the levels are expected to 
be much lower where agricultural crops are currently grown (Coega IDZ 
Strategic Environmental Assessment Final Report, June, 1997, 4, 33). The PPC 
plant is expected to contribute further to the S02 levels in the area and is not 
included in the Strategic Environmental Assessment Calculations. For these 
reasons the addition of further industries or expansion of the proposed ones 
are likely to push the levels of SO2 and other air pollutants in the area close to 
or beyond the limit at which damage is expected to occur to plants in terms of 
Billiton's air modeling exercise. While each of the emissions, in isolation, might 
not exceed critical levels, together they might do so. 
 Should the air quality in the Sundays River valley deteriorate to exceed the 
threshold levels of sensitive species, deleterious effects that may affect plant 
productivity may be experienced. More information is needed on current and 
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predicted air quality levels to further quantify the potential impacts of Coega's 
industrial development on vegetation (Botha and Olbrich, 1997, 26). 
 
 It is unclear how sure the above scientists were that no deleterious effects 
occur at concentrations of SO2 and other air pollutants over long periods of 
time higher than the current levels, but lower than the threshold levels they 
were working by. Recent medical research on human beings shows that even in 
the short term there are adverse effects on human health from increased 
exposure to air pollutants, such as SO2, and at lower levels than were previously 
thought, i.e. the SO2 concentration did not exceed 200 ug/m3. As Katsouyanni 
et al explain, "In Western European cities it was found that an increase of 50 
ug/m3 in sulphur dioxide or black smoke was associated with a 3% (95% 
confidence interval 2% to 4%) increase in daily mortality and the corresponding 
figure for PM10 (particulate matter smaller than 10 um in diameter) was 2% (1% 
to 3%)" (Katsouyanni, et al, 1997, 1658). 
 It appears that the management of the Coega IDZ and Harbour Project do 
not believe that agriculture will be negatively affected by the emissions from the 
proposed heavy industries. However, it is significant that Richard Fuggle finds 
it "unacceptable that the concerns of the citrus and agricultural industry have 
not been taken into account" (Review of documentation pertaining to Coega 
IDZ initiative, for Eastern Cape Citrus Forum, 14 July, 1997). 
 Assuming deleterious effects do occur, all of the following could be 
expected to be negatively affected:  citrus and vegetable yields in the lower 
Sundays and Coega River valleys, and output of animal products in the Coega 
and Alexandria areas. Moreover, if the undermining effect is equivalent to 5% 
of the citrus yield of the Sundays and Coega River valleys, a per annum income 
sacrifice will be made by the relevant farmers of about R23 million (5% of 
R459 million). Citrus farmworker jobs would also be adversely affected. 
 In addition, presuming that the estimated threshold air pollutant 
concentrations are adhered to, serious limitations will be imposed on the nature 
and scale of other industries which may be considered in the proposed 10 000 
ha Coega IDZ. It stands to reason that if the zinc, phosphoric acid and cement 
plants use up most of the "safe" capacity available in the air to assimilate 
 




Background Research Series                                                                Municipal Services Project 
30 
pollutants, others after them will necessarily be more constrained in what they 
can do and the Coega IDZ site will less appealing to these other prospective 
investors. 
 
2.4.4  Health costs 
Since the 1900s mortality rates have fallen for most major causes of death. The 
most conspicuous exception is cancer, even amongst cohorts in which the 
percentage of smokers has decreased (Tietenberg, 1992, 512). Increased 
exposure to toxic substances is thought to be a cause, although this is difficult 
to prove, due to the long latency periods for cancer (from 15 to 40 years). 
Based on the fact that the zinc smelter and phosphoric acid plant will 
substantially increase the levels of toxins in the area, an increase in the incidence 
of cancer could be expected amongst its residents some time after they 
commence production. In addition there may well be a negative effect on 
health in the short term. 
 There are two distinct threats to public health from the pollutants emitted 
at Coega:  sulphur dioxide, and heavy metal emissions (Tennille and Le Quesne, 
1997). First, sulphur dioxide is one of the major pollutants that would be 
generated by the proposed zinc, phosphoric acid and cement facilities. Sulphur 
dioxide is widely acknowledged as a respirator irritant and a 
bronchoconstrictor. Its effects seem to be particularly acute for asthmatics, 
which include a disproportionate share of low-income people. The specialist 
study on air pollution impacts commissioned for the Coega IDZ noted that 
such a threat was a very real concern, specifically if large increases in zinc 
production did materialise at a later stage in the development of the refinery. 
 The WHO recommended maximum hourly concentration of sulphur 
dioxide is 340 µg/m3. Under upset conditions, the hourly ambient air 
concentration of sulphur dioxide is predicted to be 328µg/m3. This level does 
not appear to include existing pollution, and certainly not the substantial 
sulphur dioxide emissions from the proposed PPC plant. The inclusion of 
these estimates, which still must be done, could well increase the hourly 
concentration of sulphur dioxide above WHO guidelines. According to the 
SEA, the daily emissions from the zinc and phosphoric acid facilities would be 
59µg/m3 under initial production, rising to 89µg/m3 under the proposed 
increase in production. 
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 The consequences of sulphur dioxide pollution should not be taken lightly. 
In particular, substantive new research from Europe indicates that the health 
consequences of sulphur dioxide may be more serious than previously believed. 
According to the new research, the levels of sulphur dioxide that would be 
emitted by proposed industrial facilities at Coega could lead to a 3% increase in 
mortality in the vicinity of Port Elizabeth (Katsouyanni, 1997). 
 Second, the heavy metal emission from the proposed facilities at Coega are 
potential carcinogens. In particular, significant quantities of zinc will be emitted 
into the atmosphere, as well as far smaller quantities of arsenic, cadmium, 
cobalt, mercury, nickel and silver. These emissions not only pose a potential 
threat through direct transmission to humans, but also through accumulation in 
plants and soils which is then passed on to humans. This latter pathway is 
susceptible to contamination through much lower levels of contamination as 
toxicity levels in plants and soil can accumulate over a period of time. 
 Once again, recently published research has indicated that the carcinogenic 
consequences of certain industrial facilities may be greater than previously 
believed. Hazard proximities of childhood cancers in Great Britain from 1953 - 
80, published in the Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health, 
demonstrates the increased incidence of childhood cancers among 
communities in the vicinity of industrial facilities, including some of the 
facilities proposed for the Coega IDZ. 
 If 100 000 work days per year are lost due to increased pollutant levels in 
the environment, and each work day would generate R70, the health cost would 
be R7 million (a liability shared by national, provincial and local government). 
The really big expense would be the transfers of income required to care for the 
sick (which could easily triple this cost). If the additional cost of health care is 
double the production loss cost, it will be R14 million. The total cost of 
decreased human health would be:  R7 million + R14 million = R21 million per 
annum. 
 
2.4.5  Summary of costs 
A summary of the estimated negative impacts of the Coega IDZ and Harbour 
project is presented in Table 3. An estimated R114 million in annual income 
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losses due to the Coega IDZ and Harbour Project should be subtracted from 
the income generated (between R191 million in the conservative scenario and 






Estimates of the negative 
income and recreational value effects 
of the Coega IDZ and Harbour Project 
 
Production undermined by Coega IDZ project  Income or Recreation 
Value Sacrifice 
(R millions)  
 1. Greater Addo Park and ecotourism1   50    
 2. Reduced fishing yields in Algoa Bay2    20   
 3. Reduced citrus and vegetable yields in Sundays River valley3   23   
4. Ill health income losses4   21  
 Total 114 
  
 
   Notes 
 
1. Based on 10% of estimated total annual recreational value estimated for  
 Algoa Bay natural recreation assets (also see Final EIR Coega IDZ, 262). 
   2.  Based on 20% of estimated annual income generated from commercial fishing in Algoa 
Bay (also see Final EIR Coega IDZ, 205). 
   3.  Based on 5% of the value of the Sundays and Coega River valley citrus exports. 
   4.  Based only on 100 000 working days lost per annum at R70/day plus R14 for medical 
treatment of sick. 
 
 
2.5   Coega's use of water and electricity 
2.5.1   Consumption patterns 
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The two main industries seriously being considered in the Coega IDZ and 
Harbour Project are the zinc smelter and a phosphoric acid plant. Together 
these two plants are expected to consume 4 860 000 cubic metres of fresh 
water per annum, and 968 000 million Watt hours per annum. 
 The electricity consumption of the two firms is expected to peak at 135 
MW, which assuming a power factor of 0,9, converts to a 150 MVA 
requirement. This demand constitutes about 0,5% of Eskom's total supply 
capacity and 4% of its available surplus installed capacity (African 
Environmental Solutions, 1997). 
 Which local authority will control the Coega IDZ is an unresolved issue at 
this point in time, but it appears likely that all users of water and electricity 
(other than those who negotiate otherwise) will have to purchase it from the 
Port Elizabeth municipality, because this authority has the rights to supply 
these services along the coastal zone between the Sundays and Van Staden's 
River mouths (Richardson, 1998b). 
 The companies originally anticipated to produce the zinc (Billiton) and 
phosphoric acid (Kynoch) negotiated a separate deal whereby they would only 
purchase water from the Port Elizabeth municipality. Electrical power would be 
purchased directly from Eskom at the same reduced cost that Billiton 
negotiated for the Richard's Bay aluminum smelter (African Environmental 
Solutions, 1997; interview, Nico Potgieter). The differential cost and use of 
capacity of both water and electricity are addressed below. 
 
2.5.2  Water 
The opportunity cost of water must be taken into account, because in some 
parts of the Eastern Cape, including the Algoa Bay, a decision to devote water 
resources to one project may well preclude another, either by eliminating its 
supply or by making its supply too expensive (if not immediately, at some time 
in the near future). For this reason the water issue is particularly relevant to 
strategic decision making with respect to the Coega IDZ project. The heavy 
industries proposed for the IDZ are also heavy users of water. According to the 
Proposed Eastern Cape Zinc Refinery and Associated Phosphoric Acid Plant 
Final Environmental Impact Report (African Environmental Solutions, 1997, 4, 
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11) the water requirement of the proposed zinc and phosphoric acid complex is 
13,3 Ml/day. The current average water demand for all existing industries in 
Port Elizabeth is calculated to be 14,6 Ml/day (Silva McGillivray, 1997, 32). 
 Although at least one study argues that there is sufficient water for the IDZ 
(Silva McGillivray, 1997), this is subject to debate. Current readily available bulk 
water supplies from local rivers are insufficient for Port Elizabeth, especially in 
times of drought. For this reason Port Elizabeth supplements its supplies from 
the Orange River system. Recent experience with water allocations of citrus 
farmers in the Sundays River valley casts doubt over just how much water is 
available from the Orange River Scheme in times of drought, given that it has 
been impossible since mid-1993 for farmers to acquire increased water rights. 
There thus emerges, initially, a question as to whether the IDZ should be the 
favoured consumer. Despite massive differences in capital requirements it 
appears more jobs per one million litres of water are created in agriculture (such 
as citrus farming, a competing use with the IDZ) than in the proposed heavy 
industry. For each one million litres of water consumed per day (4 860 292 m3 
annually), the proposed zinc and phosphoric acid complex is associated with 
approximately 56 permanent on site jobs (and an annual income of about R20 
423 000 from the complex's production), compared with citrus farming in the 
lower Coega and Sundays river valleys which would generate 188 permanent on 
site jobs (and an annual income of R4 389 000).  
 The cost of the water to be used in the zinc smelter and phosphoric acid 
plant must still be negotiated. The Port Elizabeth municipality are in the 
process of revising their tariff structure, replacing the flat rate of R2,18+VAT 
(R2,49) per kl plus an availability charge, with a 7-step tariff, starting at R2,43 
per kl for the first 30kl per month and increasing in 6 steps up to R8 per kl for 
consumption in excess of 80 kl. 
 The change over to a 7-step tariff is expected to come into force for 
domestic users from 1 July, 1998. Charges for industrial users are not expected 
to be introduced as rapidly as this (reflecting the effective lobbying power of 
Port Elizabeth business representatives). At present a 3-tier tariff structure is 
proposed for industry, but the way the tariffs are calculated -- with normal or 
base consumption levels as the lowest-cost tier -- will make it likely that only 
the lowest rate will apply to industrial users. A higher rate only applies to 
industrial users who exceed these levels (interview, Kevin Felix). 
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 The rate that would currently apply to Coega industries is the lowest rate, 
about R2,49 per kl. The lack of cross-subsidisation represents a lost 
opportunity, because the EIA on the zinc refinery and phosphoric acid plant 
appeared to commit these companies to paying a price for water which allowed 
lifeline requirements to be satisfied first (African Environmental Solutions, 
1997, 14/2). 
 
2.5.3.  Electricity 
Billiton and Kynoch had indicated from the outset that they would purchase 
their electricity directly from Eskom. Their demand is about 25% of Port 
Elizabeth's current demand. This purchase will be a customised pricing 
package; the details of which have yet to be determined. It is expected that they 
will negotiate the same arrangement as Alusaf (Richards Bay), i.e., the Megaflex 
tariff structure together with a commodity linked pricing arrangement and an 
"interruptable" power discount option (about 5-10%, in return for a potential 
interruption of service of up to about 100 hours). Electricity pricing is made up 
of several components:  basic charge, maximum demand charge, active energy 
charge, reactive energy charge, and transmission percentage surcharge (Eskom, 
1998, 16-17). The actual rates depend upon the spread of energy consumption 
over peak, standard and off-peak times. The electricity rates proposed do not 
provide any other consumers with a cross-subsidy, except possibly part of the 
installation costs of new electricity connections provided to new receivers in the 
electrification of South Africa project. At present rates of consumption the 
connection costs (about R2 500 per connection) of most of the new receivers 
cannot be recouped in service charges (interview, Jonathon Probert). This 
failure to cross-subsidise at the local level makes it more difficult to realise the 
multiplier benefits of infrastructure, in economic and socio-ecological terms, as 
described in Section 3. 
 
 
3. INFRASTRUCTURE TO MEET BASIC NEEDS AND  
 KICKSTART GROWTH 
 
 




Background Research Series                                                                Municipal Services Project 
36 
The debate over public infrastructure investment subsidies for Port Elizabeth 
may ultimately only be settled in relation to the key economic variables, growth 
and job creation, rather than the social justice requirement that all residents of 
Port Elizabeth gain access to basic infrastructural services. It is therefore 
important to show that the most direct way of enhancing local economic 
development in Port Elizabeth, and in most locales, is through employment 
that allows households to survive, reproduce and save for future consumption 
or investment. 
 After considering the impact of infrastructure investment upon job 
creation, we examine the related issues of worker productivity and small 
enterprise creation (3.1). However, the pricing of infrastructure and services is 
just as crucial, particularly the need for properly-designed subsidies and cross-
subsidies (as an alternative to the existing policy) (3.2). In addition, there is a 
growing awareness of the need for demand-side management of municipal 
resources (especially water) (3.3). But the progress envisaged in these areas is 
potentially threatened by the growing momentum towards privatisation of 
municipal services (3.4). 
 This section provides the essence of a "bottom-up" approach to Local 
Economic Development. There are many other aspects of the human and 
social condition that are promoted by access to infrastructure and municipal 
services, including greater gender equality, improved public health, lower levels 
of racial segregation, and improved social capital (Bond, 1998). However, it is 
primarily the economic case that is made for the purposes of this paper. 
 
3.1   Jobs, productivity and SMMEs 
3.1.1   Job creation 
Infrastructure-related employment is largely in the field of construction. Formal 
sector construction employment includes residential (high and low-income 
groups), non-residential (commercial, industrial and civic amenities) as well as 
civil engineering construction (for infrastructure, bulk infrastructure and earth 
works). 
 Employment based upon infrastructure development was often anticipated 
to be the main engine of job creation in post-apartheid South Africa. For 
example, in 1993, formal sector employment generated by low-cost housing 
construction alone was estimated by National Housing Forum consultants as 
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increasing from 233 000 in 1992 to 400 000 in 2010, and related informal sector 
employment from 984 000 to 1,7 million (BMI Building Research Strategy 
Consulting Unit, 1993, 70). 
 According to the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy, 
"Construction is largely labour intensive and provides jobs and training, while 
improvements in housing and infrastructure enhance the productivity of labour 
and the quality of urban life." GEAR also estimated that "Government 
programmes can add a further quarter of the new jobs, mainly through 
accelerated labour-based infrastructural development and maintenance of 
public works in urban and rural areas" (Department of Finance, 1996, 
Appendix 6.3 and section 8.2). The Green Paper on Public Works noted that with 
respect to job-creation, "Some estimates are that 3-3,5 million people could 
benefit from public works programmes in South Africa today (depending on 
the state of the economy, the number participating at any one time would 
probably be 1-2,5 million)" (Department of Public Works, 1996, 4). 
 Thus far such expectations have failed to materialise. Yet infrastructure and 
housing continue to be key Reconstruction and Development Programme policy 
priorities, and construction work more generally remains an extremely 
important part of the labour market, as well as in relation to fixed capital 
investment. 
 There have been three main sources of research on potential employment 
creation associated with infrastructure (including housing construction). These 
have been based upon formal sector jobs alone (Merrifield, 1996), upon 
hypotheses about informal sector activity (conducted by the Building Industries 
Federation of South Africa [BIFSA]), and upon jobs associated with 
infrastructure investment through the "Urban Infrastructure Investment 
Framework" (UIIF) (RDP Ministry, 1994-95). Since BIFSA's methodology 
highlights the informal sector and since much government policy indirectly lends 
itself to the development of this sector, it is worthwhile to include a description 
of this indirect feature within the construction industry. 
 It is possible to estimate the ratio of employment per R1 million spent in 
the construction industry. Of greatest influence is whether employment is in 
residential, non-residential or civil engineering construction, with employment 
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varying between 12,5 jobs per R1 million in non-residential new construction to 
23 jobs per R1 million in public housing construction. However, employment 
generation in the civil engineering sector is much lower, with only 6,7 jobs for 
every R1 million spent. But by adding employment creation in the informal 
sector, the average for all housing construction is raised to as high as 29,6 jobs 
for every R1 million spent, a figure competitive with labour-intensive 
manufacturing (Merrifield, 1996). 
 BIFSA's (1995) estimates for employment creation through construction 
are nearly as optimistic:  27,6 jobs for every million rand spent. The method 
used to arrive at this figure is -- using Receiver of Revenue statistics of total 
turnover in the construction industry (R18 billion) -- to extrapolate based on 
assumptions regarding the ratio of materials to labour (at specified levels of 
wages). Although the informal sector is not explicitly included in this 
methodology, total turnover does include building materials purchased from 
formal sector suppliers, which in turn lends itself to some measure of informal 
building activity, albeit indirect. 
 Based on differing assumptions about ratio of materials to labour, BIFSA 
generated scenarios about the components of construction that relate to 
differential skills. Drawn from industry data, the most common scenario for the 
components of construction work is the following:  50% unskilled workers @ 
R45 per day; 26% semi skilled workers @ R72 per day; 19% skilled workers @ 
R120 per day; and 5% supervisory staff @ R160 per day. The apparently low 
daily wage for un- and semi skilled workers takes into account the irregular 
nature of employment for workers in this industry, especially those in the 
informal sector who are usually laid off between contracts. By weighting skills 
in this way, BIFSA conclude that 27,6 jobs are created for every R1 million 
spent in the construction industry. 
 The UIIF assumptions and calculations were even more ambitious. On the 
assumption that intermediate-level standards would prevail on average for 
South Africa as a whole, for every R1 million spent on infrastructure, 200 
person-years could be generated in construction work directly (along with 
another 30 person-years in indirect employment). The estimated job creation of 
bulk infrastructure, upgrading and new stands worth R19,2 billion would be 
4,426 million jobs per annum (RDP Ministry, 1994-95, 72). 
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3.1.2   Productivity 
It is not only the quantity and remuneration of jobs that is important, but 
increasingly the quality of employment and the depth of skills that employees 
bring to their work (World Bank, 1993). There are several means of considering 
economic benefits that flow from enhanced literacy and productivity of 
citizens. Electrification reduces reproductive rates through altering social 
relationships and generating economic opportunities, and as a result, women in 
electrified areas place more emphasis on children's education than on children 
as productive agents. Electrification provides some of the essential prerequisites 
for education, such as lighting and opportunities for efficient administration. In 
addition it generates the potential for longer schooldays, opening of night 
schools and access to audio visual aids. It enables children and adults to study 
at home and offers the opportunity for health promotion through the 
broadcast media such as television and radio. 
 Education has been shown to directly affect a range of variables which, 
taken together, contribute to the health status of domestic units and ultimately 
of the nation. There is a high rate of social return through investment in 
education and this rate of return is substantially higher for women than men. 
Female education has been shown to impact upon reproductive rates, child-
rearing practices and child-mortality rates. Higher levels of maternal education 
have a significant impact on nutrition of children, improved child health and 
reduction in diarrhoea morbidity. 
 The use of electricity in a household can have several effects on the 
productivity of inhabitants. Firstly, improved lighting brings about considerable 
improvements to the quality of the working environment of students and 
scholars. The ability to study at home, although also dependent on other factors 
such as the number of people in the household and the number of rooms 
available, is certainly enhanced through electrification. Improved lighting and 
air quality can also increase the quality of life of inhabitants, and this has a 
positive effect on their productivity in places of employment or income 
generation. 
 Finally, good health results in fewer days lost to illness, increased 
productivity, greater opportunities to obtain better paying jobs and longer 
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working lives. Healthier workers earn more because they are more productive 
and can get better paying jobs. Environmentally caused diseases have been 
shown to impair productive work and lead to heavy loss of income and 
malnutrition in family members. When illness occurs the loss of income is 
borne by the household and healthier members have to work harder and longer 
to make up for the loss in income. This is particularly a burden on the women 
caregivers of each household. 
 
3.1.3   SMMEs 
The anticipated burgeoning of Small, Medium and Micro Enterprises (SMMEs) 
may be hampered at the outset if access to infrastructural services such as water 
and electricity is not ensured. This is particularly the case for small enterprises 
(which tend to hire low-income workers) and for microenterprises (which are 
often a survival strategy for the low-income people themselves). 
 Such infrastructure access often comes initially through home-based 
activities, so a full supply of services (not limited, for example, to a single yard 
tap or small-voltage electricity meter) to residences can also be seen as an 
investment in Local Economic Development. It has been estimated that one 
new small business can be created for every ten electricity connections, and that 
during the next ten years an additional R8 billion will be spent on appliances 
from electrification (at existing rates of expansion), which in turn has spin-offs 
in the domestic appliance sector (Bond, 1998). But measuring the impact of 
infrastructure on SMMEs is difficult. 
 To take one example, it is notoriously difficult to quantify the multiplier 
effects of electrification. Econometric studies of electrification have generated 
(unrealistic) estimates of up to 1 000 000 new jobs created during the first ten 
years of the programme, with an 11% cumulative increase in GDP. More 
accurate analysis based on recent experience with electrification suggests that 
for every 100 households which are connected, between 10 and 20 new 
economic activities are started. For example, electrical fridges are often acquired 
by small traders to store drinks and perishable goods; in one rural Kwazulu-
Natal town, of 23 enterprises 21 required electrical refrigerators to store 
produce, meat and drinks for sale. The benefits of moving from very low 
electricity supplies (5-8 Amps) to an intermediate 20A supply are particularly 
large given the need to operate appliances such as refrigerators and small 
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motors. For enterprises involved in welding or carpentry, higher levels of 
service are required (van Horen, 1994, 1996). 
 
3.2   Infrastructure service pricing 
3.2.1   The need for cross-subsidies 
To achieve any of these local economic benefits of infrastructure investment 
requires very close attention to the ongoing subsidies that will permit the 
systems to operate. Indeed the primary reason that infrastructure investments 
do not pay off is that many people do not have enough income to afford the 
recurrent (operating and maintenance) charges associated with the service. 
Eskom's rural electrification programme, for example, has had enormous 
problems paying for itself because consumption levels are so low due to lack of 
affordability. Clearly, an alternative approach is required based on the 
Constitutional responsibilities set out above, namely the provision of at least a 
basic minimal amount of water/sanitation (50 litres per person per day is the 
medium-target in the Reconstruction and Development Programme) and electricity (20 
kiloWatt hours per capita per month) as a lifeline amount, with higher volume 
consumption (i.e., following the 50th liter of water) attracting much higher (and 
rising) tariffs. 
 In general, the best administrative system for this would be a free lifeline 
amount provided through metered taps and metered electricity hookups, with 
technical systems to reduce the amount to be consumed to the lifeline 
minimum in the event of non-payment on amounts higher than that minimum. 
This is technically feasible and inexpensive, and has already been applied in 
some circumstances in South Africa. At present, 61% of Port Elizabeth 
residents have water meters, and all those who presently receive subsidies have, 
in return, agreed with the municipality to the prospect of delimiting the water 
flow through washers in the event of non-payment. 
 The issue of consumption levels has implications for the wider benefits 
anticipated from infrastructure. For example, to realise the health benefits of 
infrastructure, the quantity of water is almost more important than water 
quality. For this reason, municipalities should strive to supply private household 
taps or at minimum yard taps when they make infrastructure investments, as 
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distance to the water source is the most important factor affecting the quantity 
of water used by households. Improvements in both water and sanitation 
produce larger impacts than either alone. In addition, providing a lifeline source 
of water would make an enormous difference, given present low levels of per 
capita water consumption in low-income communities. 
 A cross-subsidised lifeline system must obviously be designed with a 
careful regulatory approach so as to avoid ruinous competition between 
individual service providers (municipalities or provinces competing for 
corporate investment or wealthy residents' settlement by lowering the cross-
subsidies). For that reason the Reconstruction and Development Programme suggested 
that such redistribution occur at a national scale (African National Congress, 
1994, Sections 2.6.10 and 2.7.8). 
 This approach to pricing services is not unusual when broader social 
objectives are at stake. For example, the South African government did not 
adopt a cost recovery approach to primary health care (it is free to all citizens) 
not only because health is a basic human right guaranteed in the Constitution's 
Bill of Rights and because low-income people's spending on healthcare is 
typically subtracted from spending on vital food and other components of 
good health, but also because it is administratively expensive to do so. It often 
costs more in cost recovery administration than can be squeezed out of low-
income people desperate for treatment. 
 In Port Elizabeth, there is already cross-subsidisation with respect to the 
provision of electricity. Other Council spending benefits from large surpluses 
made on electricity. According to the Port Elizabeth Municipal Operating 
Budget, the 1996/97 spending on electricity was just over R405 million, while 
income was R477 million, leaving a R72 million surplus. Other major services 
ran at a loss, including water (R97 million expenditure, R87 million income), 
sewerage (R70 million expenditure, R57 million income) and refuse (R30 
million expenditure, R29 million income). The entire city budget was R987 
million in 1996/97, and income amounted to R1 017 million, allowing a R30 
million surplus. 
 
3.2.2   The Indigence Policy 
Instead of promoting cross-subsidisation from high-use commercial, industrial 
and residential consumers to low-income consumers, however, a different 
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policy was adopted for subsidising rates and recurrent water charges (though 
not electricity, which is unsubsidised), known as the Indigence Policy. 
 If a household lives in some dwelling supplied by the Port Elizabeth 
municipality and their earnings are below a specified level they qualify for a 
provincially funded subsidy of their water and rates; the subsidy depending on 
their level of income. The amount of water subsidised is limited to 12 kl per 
month. Surprisingly, if consumption of 12 kl water per month is exceeded only 
6 kl is provided free (not 12). To qualify for a 100% subsidy a household must 
earn less than R470 per month, and to qualify for a 50% subsidy it must earn 
between R470 and R800 per month. (Also under review is the possibility that 
households with two pensioners and hence an income of R940 per month will 
also qualify for the 50% subsidy.) About 9 000 households receive a 100% 
subsidy and 10 000 a 50% subsidy. Many people, who would qualify for a 
subsidy on the basis of their low incomes, are left out because the dwellings 
they live on have no connection to the municipal water supply. Of 
approximately 256 000 Port Elizabeth households, only 19 000 have signed up 
to receive the indigence subsidy, notwithstanding the estimate (according to a 
1997 survey) that 55 000 households earn less than R800 per month (interview, 
Abri Vermuelen). 
 The administrative costs of the Indigence Policy are high, at more than 
R115 000 per month just for wages of workers who must monitor the policy. 
Council decided in July 1997 to hire 80 staff on one-year contracts. 
 Disconnections have risen significantly in the wake of the application of 
the Indigence Policy, as the Council apparently believes there is increased 
legitimacy to disconnect those not accommodated for by the policy. According 
to van Huyssteen (1998, 12), "Currently about 4 000 [pre-paid meter] 
installations are inspected per month, with about 800 disconnections being 
carried out." In fact, the last three months of 1997 witnessed 12 698 electricity 
disconnections, followed by 9 931 reconnections. There were 534 water 
disconnections and 218 reconnections. According to Port Elizabeth's 
submission to Project Viability, the number of debtors paying accounts 
regularly was 89% of the total 256 770 households in the municipality 
(Department of Constitutional Development, 1998, 4). 
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3.2.3   Subsidies and cross-subsidies in water and electricity pricing 
As noted above, a universal lifeline supply is an alternative approach to meeting 
the needs of low-income people, for it better targets subsidies to those with low 
consumption. If 50 liters per day per person lifeline water and 20kWhs per 
month per person lifeline electricity were provided to all urban households in 
Port Elizabeth, a manageable amount of water and electricity would be required 
per annum (assume a population of 256 000 households with an average of 3 
per household). Water would require (256 000 x 3) x (50 litres per day x 365 
days) = 14 016 000 kilolitres. Electricity would require (256 000 x3) x (20 kWhs 
per month per person x 12 months) = 184 320 000 kWhs. 
 Could Port Elizabeth afford this, even without national cross-
subsidisation? The municipality's foregone revenue from providing the free 
water would be divided into consumption and availability. For consumption, 14 
016 000 litres x R2,18 per kl = R30 554 880. For availability:  256 000 x (R2,77 
per month x 12 months) = R8 509 440. The total cost would be R39 064 320 
(VAT not applicable). The cost to the municipality of the electricity would be 
184 320 000 kWhs x R0,19523 per kWh = R35 984 793 (VAT not applicable). 
 With the cost of universal electricity lifeline supply easily within the existing 
electricity budget surplus, and water supply at a similar reasonable cost (both 
below R40 million per annum), there remains the issue of which sectors can 
carry responsibility for the cross-subsidy associated with lifeline supply. The 
analysis depends upon the price elasticities of water and electricity, which are 
not feasible to estimate in cases where quite large increases might occur, and 
which vary substantially across the range of user groups. 
 In the case of water, at the flat rate of R2,18 per kl and the set availability 
charges prevailing up to the end of June, 1998, the costs of water supply 
(R103,9 million per annum) are just covered at current budget levels, leaving 
only a small surplus on water provision for the city of about R1 million per 
annum. Availability charges are set according to the diameter of the pipe 
supplying the water. The smallest pipe charged for is a 15mm one; the charge 
being R2,77 plus VAT per month. The largest pipe charged for is one 
exceeding 150mm, and the charge for it is R207,75 plus VAT per month 
(Schedule of Prescribed Charges in terms of the Port Elizabeth Water Supply 
By Law; interview, Tom Proudlock). 
 However, a new 7-tier tariff structure on domestic consumption proposed 
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for 1 July, 1998, is expected to generate a surplus of about R14 million over the 
financial year 1 July 1998 - 30 June 1999. The Department of Water Affairs and 
Forestry have put pressure on the Port Elizabeth municipality to use this 
surplus to fund the working for water project around Port Elizabeth (which 
costs about R24 million per annum). The Port Elizabeth municipality have not, 
however, committed themselves to funding the latter project indefinitely. 
Although it would be unfortunate, it appears possible that they may give 
assistance on a once off basis. 
 If the R14 million surplus was retained and Working for Water activities 
funded through additional revenues, the amount could be used to provide a 
large amount of lifeline water:  6 422 018,3 kl could be given (R14 /R2,18), 
thereby enabling 351 891 people to be provided free with 50 l per day [6 422 
018 000/(50x365)] (interview, Kevin Felix). It would also be possible to impose 
sharper increases in the tariff structure, and to apply it to commercial (not just 
residential users). As noted below, however, there is resistance to this approach 
amongst Council officials (who instead apparently favour privatisation as a 
route). 
 In the case of sewerage, currently the Port Elizabeth municipality charges 
R11,46 for sewerage service provision to all of the 35 000 households which 
live in formal dwellings but have no water meters installed, and charges R6,50 
to the 20 000 households who live in informal dwellings to whom they provide 
these services (these charges are called community charges). With the new 7-
step water tariff system a new sewerage tariff system will also be introduced, a 
hydraulic tariff system, with a proposed rate of R1,20 per kl. 
 In the case of electricity, current plans will allow the zinc smelter and 
phosphoric acid plant to avoid paying the Port Elizabeth municipality for their 
electricity, which would in turn prevent the municipality using these payments 
to raise a surplus on electricity sales. The Port Elizabeth municipality was able 
to generate a surplus on its electricity provision of R72 million in 1996/97. This 
surplus is currently channeled into general revenues and has the effect of 
reducing the rates payable. The Coega IDZ anchor companies are forecast to 
use about 25% of what all existing consumers in Port Elizabeth do. In 
bypassing the Port Elizabeth municipality as an electricity vendor, the zinc and 
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phosphoric acid producers will therefore avoid contributing about R18 million 
to Port Elizabeth in the form of surplus on electricity sales. If this surplus was 
captured and used to provide lifeline electricity supplies, more than 92 million 
kWhs could be supplied, thereby enabling more than 380 000 people to have 
free access to 20kWhs per month (City of Port Elizabeth Electricity Tariff 
Summary, 1 July, 1997-30 June, 1998). If higher rates were applied, much more 
cross-subsidisation would be feasible. 
 In conclusion, there is scope for cross-subsidisation in water and electricity 
tariff structures in the Port Elizabeth municipal area. But such cross-
subsidisation is only one element of demand-side management, particularly as 
applied to water. As noted in the subsequent section, there is emerging 
resistance to the concept. 
 
3.3   The case for demand-side management 
The municipality's partial movement towards cross-subsidisation partly came 
through a "carrot" offered by Minister Asmal "of an amount of R5 million and 
a further unspecified eight-figure sum for the purpose of creating over 2 000 
job opportunities clearing invasive alien vegetation and planting indigenous 
vegetation in the Driftsands Forest Reserve together with such other areas in 
the city as may be agreed..." (Port Elizabeth Municipality, 1998, 1). The DWAF 
carrot was attractive, and highly celebrated as a means of combining public 
works employment, ecological conservation and water systems management. 
According to Bay Public Relations (1998a), 
 
The Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry Kadar Asmal has 
launched a [Working for Water] project to eradicate fire-hazardous 
alien vegetation around Port Elizabeth which will provide 
employment to 2 000 out-of-work people until the end of March. 
Donating the first R5 m to kick-start the project, Prof. Asmal said 
that the employment of 2 000 people could sustain as many as 20 000 
people. The project comes in the wake of a spate of veld fires in the 
city over December when firefighters fought blazes around the clock. 
The workers, from five areas around the city, will learn skills 
programmes such as stocktaking, supervision and basic mechanics 
which will offer them a chance of employment in forestry or work 
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involved in the outdoor environment afterwards. Clearing the alien 
vegetation like the exotic Port Jackson willow and the rooikrans 
should allow the indigenous vegetation, like fynbos, to rehabilitate. 
 
The numbers of people that can be supported by this programme are extremely 
high (in part, unfortunately, because of the relatively low wages paid). 
Moreover, the number of women included is anticipated to be far higher than 
their ratio in the formal workforce, which is itself an effective poverty-
alleviation targeting strategy. 
 Because of the catalyst provided by this funding, and on the basis of 
further lobbying by the Working for Water programme, at a meeting in January 
1998 the Council committed that Port Elizabeth would "become a major role 
model through the development of an urban water management system" -- 
defined as "the reduction of the demand on the supply system to extend the 
useful life of the system rather than increase the supply capacity" (Port 
Elizabeth Municipality, 1998, 1,2) -- which would include:  a) a Port Elizabeth 
Working for Water project; b) a multiple stepped water tariff; c) an assurance of 
supply tariff; d) informative billing; e) intensive communication; f) water audit 
by schools; g) use of water-saving devices; h) water-wise gardening; i) water-
wise food production; j) national water regulations; and k) water loss 
management. 
 Costs of implementing the system would be met from general rates. Most 
elements of demand side management are new, although one that isn't, water 
loss management, has been policy since at least 1965, according to the City 
Engineer. However, the number of water loss inspectors had been reduced 
from eight to three and hence "Very little water loss management is practiced" 
(Port Elizabeth Municipality, 1998, 8). 
 Changes of the magnitude desired are often difficult to cope with, and the 
City Engineer made various objections to some of the demand management 
techniques. For example, the information sheet included with the account was 
meant to include a graph, but "Many consumers will not comprehend the graph 
and water meters will have to be read monthly. Informative billing can only be 
applied to consumers who are metered," which represent just 61% of all 
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households (Port Elizabeth Municipality, 1998, 5,6). (Large consumers who 
most need to conserve and who are metered would, however, understand the 
graph.) 
 Most objections, however, were raised by the City Engineer about the 
implementation of rising block tariffs. Not only have the number of blocks 
been reduced from DWAF's proposed 11 blocks to 7 blocks, but businesses 
have been excluded (and when they will be included, the block tariff structure 
will not be noticeable at normal consumption levels). Yet the concept of 
progressive block tariffs isn't new to Port Elizabeth, for increasing block tariffs 
have been applied "during times of water shortage when the situation is critical 
but not an emergency" (four increasing tariff rates applied). 
 The first block has never been free, however. Moreover, Port Elizabeth has 
traditionally charged a tariff for availability (assurance of supply) to all 
consumers so as "to ensure recovery of fixed costs which is important for a 
small municipality where houses may not be occupied in Winter" (probably 
referring to other coastal resort communities). However, noted the Engineer, 
"Since 1989 it has been the policy of the City Treasurer and the City Engineer 
to remove the availability tariff but lack of sufficient income to the Water Fund 
has not allowed the removal of this tariff." DWAF proposed increasing the 
availability tariff from R2,77 to R10 per month (both with VAT added) (Port 
Elizabeth Municipality, 1998, 3). 
 The proposed block tariff system would cause quite dramatic changes to 
billing and distribution systems. Indeed, noted the City Engineer (Port 
Elizabeth Municipality, 1998, 4), 
 
The tariff principles which have been applied to tariffs promulgated 
by the Council, differ with the White Paper on Water Supply and 
Sanitation Policy, November 1994. A life-line tariff proposed by the 
White Paper is not applied by the municipality. The application of a 
life-line tariff will mean the duplication of welfare support by cross-
subsidisation within the service and by the subsidy scheme for the 
indigent. 
 
Having set up an indigence policy, as promoted by the Department of 
Constitutional Development, that notably failed to achieve its stated aims of 
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assuring all those with low incomes adequate access to water, Port Elizabeth's 
officials then used the policy's existence to argue against a replacement policy 
promoted by DWAF. The policy confusion at national level, which had grown 
since the World Bank initially drafted the Urban Infrastructure Investment 
Framework in early 1995 -- advising government to eschew cross-subsidies in 
favour of denying water to individual low-income households (RDP Ministry, 
1994/95; Bond, 1998) -- had by now trickled down to local level. 
 The implications of the policy confusion will only become more onerous 
for low-income residents. In July 1998, Port Elizabeth consumers will be 
subjected to the first (logical) linkage between sewerage tariffs and water 
consumption; "it is expected that water consumption will decrease." Only in 
July 1999 will a "gradual stepped tariff" apply, and then only to "domestic 
consumers who consume large volumes," not commercial and industrial users 
(Port Elizabeth Municipality, 1998, 5). 
 In other words, the cross-subsidisation of water will be limited at the outset 
to within the existing residential consumer base, even though this was 
responsible for only 40% or so of the total water bill. The possibility of raising 
the extremely low water rates for large businesses had already been discounted 
by virtue, reportedly, of strong Chamber of Commerce lobbying. 
 Ironically, on common-sense grounds, the idea of a "lifeline" service (of 12 
kiloliters per month) to all Port Elizabeth residents was supported, personally, 
by the city's Deputy Treasurer, who realised that the high administrative costs 
and partial coverage of the existing indigence policy were counterproductive 
(interview, Wilson). Nevertheless, amongst reasons given by the City Engineer 
for his resistance to lifeline and progressive block tariffs were that "Water 
rebates are granted by the City Treasurer under specific circumstances to avoid 
financial hardship for the consumer. If an eleven point stepped tariff is 
adopted, rebates will require time consuming calculations." The idea of 
replacing the rebates with a simple lifeline policy was not considered. The 
Engineer added, "The eleven point stepped water tariff ...is not simple for 
consumers to comprehend and administration will be very difficult" (Port 
Elizabeth Municipality, 5, 6). 
 More generally, reasons for hostility to block tariffs in South Africa became 
 




Background Research Series                                                                Municipal Services Project 
50 
clear in an October 1995 presentation to the Minister of Water Affairs and 
Forestry by John Roome (1995:50-51), who was then the World Bank's task 
manager of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project. Roome entirely ignored 
demand-side management and conservation issues associated with progressive 
block tariffs, and hence opposed block tariffs -- citing in particular the case of 
Johannesburg, which has a moderately progressive tariff structure -- for the 
valid reason that it "may limit options with respect to tertiary providers -- in 
particular private concessions much harder to establish." 
 If the World Bank's goal is to privatise water, and if by encountering an 
obligation to consider redistribution (the lifeline water supply and block tariff 
structure) when pricing water deters private bidders (since a firm's marginal 
cost curve will thus necessarily depart from a redistributive water pricing 
structure), then the Bank has no qualms about advising Minister Asmal to 
dispense with social-justice pricing. In a context in which the majority of 
African consumers use less than 2 percent of South Africa's water, the Bank 
prioritises privatisation above universal-entitlement access to water. 
 In Port Elizabeth, a similar line of pro-privatisation argument emerged 
when the City Engineer firmly advocated not adopting the multiple point 
stepped water tariff. A tender for a full investigation of how to privatise the 
city's water had just been bid upon, according to the Engineer, "and a change in 
the water tariff at this stage may pre-empt later tariff proposals to the 
disadvantage of the Municipality" (Port Elizabeth Municipality, 1998, 5). Using 
the spectre of water privatisation to oppose the introduction of socially-just 
water tariffs could have the unintended consequence, however, of uniting low-
income consumers and municipal workers. 
 
3.4   The spectre of water privatisation 
The basis for water privatisation was a visit by the World Bank's deputy 
resident representative in September 1996 (Bond, 1998). The week-long model-
building exercise he conducted with the deputy treasurer focused entirely on 
one option:  increasing capital expenditure by privatising the city's water works. 
Various claims about likely efficiency enhancements were made, some of which 
-- such as the feasible reduction of staff from 6,5 to 3,5 per 1 000 water 
consumers, and a 1,2 percent interest rate advantage on capital-related 
borrowing for a private firm in contrast to the municipality (Port Elizabeth 
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Municipality, 1997, 2) -- were based on dubious assumptions. In short, argued 
the deputy treasurer and World Bank, only the loss of many hundreds of union 
jobs, the opportunity for huge rates of private profit, and the more thorough 
commodification of services will allow the city to expand water-related 
infrastructure to tens of thousands of residents of unserved townships and 
shack settlements. 
 At a two-day meeting to discuss the matter in early February 1998, critical 
reactions emerged. Representatives of the SA Municipal Workers Union 
(Samwu) recalled their own national slogan -- "No to privatisation! 50 litres of 
water per person per day free of charge!" -- as a means of disentangling the 
false division between producers and consumers. Outsiders offered advice. A 
Johannesburg lawyer from Rand Water -- the country's largest intermediate 
buyer of water -- suggested a "public-public" partnership based on a water 
utility model instead. A representative of the International Labour Research and 
Information Group in Cape Town presented options for public sector reform 
as a means of improving services. 
 All of this was reactive, however. Already a year earlier, the Municipality's 
Director for Administration conceded, there had been "pressure for Port 
Elizabeth to carry the [privatisation] investigations further... from banks and 
commercial concerns" -- Banque Paribas, Rand Merchant Bank, Colechurch 
International, Development Bank of Southern Africa, Generale des Eaux, 
Metsi a Sechaba Holdings, Sauer International and Lyonnaise Water had all met 
with Port Elizabeth officials -- as well as from the Department of 
Constitutional Development, which allocated R2 million from a R50 million US 
Agency for International Development grant to fund Port Elizabeth's 
privatisation business plan development (Port Elizabeth Municipality, 1997, 6). 
The workshop participants found themselves, in a sense, at the end of a chain 
that began with international capital and that was welded together by 
international development agencies and national and local states. 
 The prospect of privatisation, hence, appeared as one of the forthcoming 
barriers to socially-just tariffs, which in turn could have been the basis for a 
Local Economic Development strategy with bottom-up, not top-down 
characteristics. The conclusion suggests means of reversing this logic. 
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4.  CONCLUSION 
 
In one of the most detailed studies ever conducted of the apartheid economy, 
Ben Fine and Zav Rustomjee (1996, 252) conclude The Political Economy of South 
Africa with the observation that South Africa's "strengths arise out of the 
productive and infrastructural capacities that have been built up around its core 
[minerals and energy] sectors. The weaknesses arise from the failure of this to 
be vertically integrated forward into the rest of the economy." 
 The weaknesses of Port Elizabeth's leading economic growth strategy -- 
the Coega deep-water port and IDZ -- follow directly from the failure of its 
proponents to establish the conditions for forward linkages. Public funds, land, 
marine activities, water, and electricity are to be utilised in enormous quantities 
at Coega. A combination of other activities -- for example, an agro-tourism 
option promoted by other local interest groups (Bond, Hosking and Robinson, 
1998) -- provides greater benefits and more sensibly and sustainably utilises 
these resources. In particular, a basic need infrastructure investment and cross-
subsidisation strategy would generate both human comfort and economic 
activity that transcends the current provision of municipal services. 
 As Fine and Rustomjee remark (1996, 252), "we place considerable 
emphasis upon a state programme of public expenditure to provide social and 
economic strategy. This forms part of a strategy to provide for basic needs. The 
problem of how to finance such a programme is less acute than the formation 
of the political, social and institutional capacity to carry it out." In short, for 
South Africa in general, infrastructure and a more balanced utilisation of 
resources such as water and electricity should be at the very foundation of any 
economic strategy. This was confirmed in the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme, in the quotes cited at the outset of this paper. 
 The difficulty of relying on a major piece of transport infrastructure -- the 
R1,5 billion publicly funded Coega port -- that is oriented to capital-intensive, 
export-oriented economic activity, and in a manner that consumes electricity 
and scarce water resources, while so much other basic infrastructure is not 
being delivered, should be obvious. In that sense the Coega port and IDZ 
exacerbate the apartheid economic legacy of division and marginalisation. The 
distinction between Port Elizabeth's (and central government's) approach to 
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infrastructure for low-income people and for Coega also violates the various 
RDP provisions discussed at the outset, namely regarding access and tariffs for 
basic infrastructural service needs, but also insofar as "The domination of 
business activities by white business and the exclusion of black people from the 
mainstream of economic activity are causes for great concern for the 
reconstruction and development process" and that "The democratic 
government must develop policies to ensure that foreign investment creates as 
much employment, technological capacity and real knowledge transfer as 
possible, allowing greater participation by workers in decision-making." The 
infrastructure projects we have reviewed in both Coega and Port Elizabeth 
townships are, hence, very much in the spirit of apartheid infrastructure. 
 The logistical and financial aspects of an alternative, bottom-up strategy 
have been documented in Section 3 (see also Eastern Cape Socio-Economic 
Consultative Council, 1998). What is lacking, however, is what Fine and 
Rustomjee refer to as "the formation of the political, social and institutional 
capacity to carry it out." That capacity can only be built from a base of adequate 
information, and while this paper begins the process, perhaps, by identifying 
key problems, far more work must be done, in line with Port Elizabeth's other 
governance processes -- Land Development Objectives, Integrated 
Development Planning, participatory budgeting, etc. -- to give the city's citizens 
an opportunity to make the choice about which kind of infrastructure 
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